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REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
ACT: LABOR CERTIFICATION, ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS,
THE REACH OF DEPORTATION, AND ENTRY BY FRAUD

Elwin Griffith*

In its earliest days, the United States did not restrict immigration
in any way. Congress imposed the first restrictions in 1875 against
"undesirable" aliens.1 Thereafter there were gradual controls until some
qualitative limitations found their way into the Immigration Act of
1917. 2 The 1924 Act introduced quantitative restrictions. 3 This 1924
Act was significant because it established a quota system based on the
national origins of those aliens residing in the United States in 1920.
These quantitative and qualitative aspects of the immigration law
remained substantially unchanged and were codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). 4 The 1965 Amendments to
the INA replaced the quota system with a seven category preference
system. s These amendments introduced new restrictions on aliens who
were coming to work in the United States, 6 thus setting the stage for
a major development in immigration policy.
There is great anxiety about the large influx of aliens.' The discussion becomes more animated when jobs are scarce and aliens may be
competing with Americans for opportunities in the labor market. 8 To
•
Professor of Law and Dean, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., 19(,(), Long Island
University; J.D., 1963, Brooklyn University; LL.M., 1964, New York University.
I. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477.
2. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
3. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
4. ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. (1982)).
5. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)).
6. See id. § 10, 79 Stat. at 917; S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in
1%5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3328, 3333-34.
7. See, e.g., SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, FINAL REPORT, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 106-07 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPoRT];
128 CONG. REC. SI0,616-17 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen); S. REP. No.
62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1983).

8. See, e.g., Numerical Limits on Immigration to the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 59, 177 (1982) (statement of J. Kasun) (favoring admission of more immigrants); Final
Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1981) (testimony of J. Donahue) (suggesting that immigrants
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minimize this competition, the INA requires aliens to obtain certification from the Department of Labor that their employment within the
United States will not displace American workers. 9 But this is not the
only place where the INA is selective. There are other restrictions which
require an alien to disclose any unsavory elements of his past such
as criminal convictions 10 or membership in the communist party. 11 The
INA also delves into an alien's mental condition, for he may be excluded
on the grounds of mental retardation 12 or insanity. ' 3 These qualitative
restrictions exclude those whom Congress regards as undesirable
immigrants. 14 There are also other restrictions and they may be found
in the system of seven preferences' 5 which distributes the 270,000 visas' 6
available annually for immigrants throughout the world, except for
certain special classes not subject to this· numerical restriction."
Even after admission, an alien is subject to a whole host of restrictions. He must watch his conduct lest he run afoul of the various
provisions. 18 The INA renders an alien deportable if he was excludable
by law at the time of his entry. 19 But it goes further and lists an additional eighteen grounds for deportation. 20 Both the exclusion and the
displace American workers) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings]; Fogel, Illegal Al{ens: Economic
Aspects and Public Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63 (1977); Wachter, The Labor
Market and Illegal Immigration: The Outlook for the 1980s, 33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 342 (1980).
9. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)§ 212(a)(l4), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(l4)
(1982) (requiring labor certification for professionals; INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § ll53(a)(3)
(1982); skilled or unskilled workers, INA § 203(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § ll53(a)(6) (1982); and nonpreference immigrants, INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § ll53(a)(7) (1982)).
10. INA § 212(a)(9)-(l0), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)-(10) (1982).
11. INA § 212(a)(28)(c), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(28)(c) (1982).
12. INA § 212(a)(I), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(l) (1982).
13. INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(2) (1982).
14. There are 33 classes of excludable aliens. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a) (1982). If
an alien who is excludable at entry does gain admission into the United States, he is deportable.
INA§ 241(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 125(a)(I) (1982). There are altogether 19 grounds for deportation.
INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
'
15. See INA §§ 212(e), 203(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ I 152(e), ll53(a) (1982).
16. INA§ 20l(a), 8 U.S.C. § 115l(a) (1982).
17. The following immigrants are not affected by the Act's numerical limitations: special
immigrants, INA§ l01(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § I IOl(a)(27) (1982); immediate relatives, INA§ 201(b),
8 U.S.C. § ll5l(b) (1982); aliens granted asylum, INA§§ 207-208, U.S.C. §§ ll57-ll58 (1982).
18. There are 19 grounds for deportation. See INA § 24l(a), 8 U.S.C. § 125l(a) (1982).
An alien who is deported needs the Attorney General's permission to return. See INA§ 212(a)(l7),
8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(l 7) (1982).
19. See INA § 241(a)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I) (1982). The term "entry" is not restricted
to the alien's initial admission into the United States. It also covers an alien's reentry. Therefore,
every time an alien enters the United States he must confront the exclusion provisions of § 212
and will be deportable under § 241(a)(l) if he gains admission as an excludable alien. See INA
§ I0l(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § I I0l(a)(13) (1982) (defining the term "entry"); INA§ 24l(a)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(I) (1982) (alien deportable if excludable at entry). The Supreme Court has developed
an exception to the reentry doctrine. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
20. See INA§ 241(a)(2)-(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)-(19) (1982). These grounds cover criminal
activity, conduct affecting national security, drug trafficking, and inability to support oneself.
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deportation provisions cover such a broad spectrum that it is not
unreasonable to suggest that every facet of an alien's background is
subject to scrutiny.
This Article will consider some of the controversial sections of the
INA and the impact of the pending immigration legislation. Part I considers the labor certification requirement, a prerequisite for third and
sixth preference immigrants. This Part concludes that clarification of
the division of authority between the Attorney General and the Secretary
of Labor, and of the intent of aliens to keep their certified jobs, would
be desirable. Part II analyzes the requirements an alien must meet to
adjust status to one, of the occupational preferences. The statutory
refusal to adjust status of aliens who accept ''unauthorized employment" must be clarified. Part III discusses two doctrines which extend
the time the INS has to investigate and act on mistakes of entering
aliens - the lack of a statute of limitations and the reentry doctrine
- and suggests methods of altering deportation procedures to provide
fairness to the alien. Part IV focuses on the provision excluding aliens
for fraud during entry and illustrates how courts have interpreted ambiguous language in the absence of clear legislative direction.
Finally, this Article concludes that current movement toward immigration reform should not ignore these legal ambiguities. A law with
such a long and varied history as the INA inevitably contains some
ambiguities and inconsistencies, and it is up to the legislaturn,to correct them when the opportunity presents itself.
I.

THE LABOR CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT

Failure of an alien to receive proper labor certification can lead to
exclusion or deportation. If an alien seeks entry through the third 21
or sixth 22 preferences, or nonpreference entry, 23 that alien must obtain
labor certification. 24 The labor certification states that the alien must
possess the minimum qualifications required for the position available.
Section 212(a)(14) 25 authorizes the exclusion of aliens coming to the
United States to work, unless they can obtain appropriate certification
21. See INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (1982).
22. See INA § 203(a)(6), 8 U .S.C. § l 153(a)(6) (1982).
23. See INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1982).
24. Approximately five percent of the immigrants admitted into the United States arrive by
the occupational preferences. In 1978, for example, 601,442 immigrants were admitted. Of these,
26,295 had occupational preferences. See 1978 INS ANN. REP. 43.
25. INA § 212(a)(l4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l4) (1982). Congress was concerned about "an
influx of aliens entering the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled
labor where the economy of individual localities is not capable of absorbing them at the time
they desire to enter this country." H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in
1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1705.
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from the Department of Labor. 26 Because the Attorney General can
deport any alien who was excludable at time of entry, 21 the requirement of certification affects the alien even after coming into the country.
The Department of Labor must certify the alien for specific work
in the United States. The Labor Department's determination seems to
be limited to the questions of whether there are sufficient qualified
workers in the United States and whether allowing the immigration
of aliens will adversely affect the employment conditions of such
workers. The objective of section 212(a)(14) is to ensure that only
workers who are in short supply do qualify for the immigrant
preferences. 28

A.

The Division of Authority between the Department of Labor
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Currently, it is unclear whether the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) has the authority to review an alien's qualifications and decide the Labor Department erred in finding the alien qualified
for the employment sought - once the Labor Department has issued
a labor certificate. Regarding the employment of incoming aliens, the
INS and the Labor Department have conflicting responsibilities. The
INS has the authority to classify aliens according to the preference
catego:i;ies of section 203,2 9 but the Labor Department's authority to
determine the availability of qualified American workers and the effect
of employing such aliens is beyond review by the INS in the absence
of fraud or willful misrepresentation. 30 Because, in making its judgment on an alien's petition for preference classification, the INS has
the authority to pass on all matters not specifically delegated to the
Labor Department, it seems the INS can review an alien's qualifications after the Labor Department has made its judgment on the two
matters assigned to it - absence of qualified American workers and
lack of adverse effects on employment conditions. 31 In addition, the
26 .• See 20 C.F.R. § 656.2 (1983) for the role of the Department of Labor in the certification
process.
27. INA § 24l(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 125 l(a)(l) (1982).
28. See l C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.40 (1966
& Cum. Supp. 1983); Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens,
96 HARV. L. REv. 1286, 1348 (1983).
29. See Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Castaneda-Gonzalez v.
INS, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 8 C.F.R. § 204.l(c) (1983).
30. See 696 F.2d at 1012; 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d) (1983).
31. See S C.F.R. §§ 204.l(c), 204.2(g) (1983) (requiring alien to submit documentary evidence
of qualifications to the Service). The Department of Labor also publishes Schedule A which
lists occupations for which the Department has determined that there are not enough United
States workers available and that the wages and working conditions of United States workers
will not be adversely affected by employing aliens in Schedule A occupations. See 20 C.F.R.
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INS has the authority to revoke a visa for good and sufficient cause. 32
If a petition for an occupational preference visa is supported by willful
and fraudulent misrepresentations, the INS can classify its action as
revocation of a visa rather than revocation of a labor certificate. 33
It occasionally has been said that the Labor• Department has the
primary authority to review alien qualifications. 34 But the legislative
history of section 212(a)(14) does not support that view. 35 The discussion leading up to its enactment concerned the two matters specifically
covered in the section. Although the Labor Department reviews an
alien's qualifications incidental to its main function under section
212(a)(14), the INS really has primary authority to determine an alien's
qualifications.
1. The case for keeping the INS out- In the leading case,
Castaneda-Gonzales v. INS, 36 the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the specific grant of authority in section 212(a)(14) to the Labor
Department overrode the INS's general or inherent power in determining whether an alien is qualified for the certified employment. The
INS can invalidate a certificate only if the alien obtained the certificate
through willful and material misrepresentation. 37 The INS cannot merely
repeat the inquiry of the Department of Labor and overrule the Department solely on a different interpretation of the facts. Otherwise, the
INS's review is limited to whether the alien possessed a certificate.
In making its decision, the court relied heavily on the language in
section 214(a)(14) stating that the Department of Labor must determine and certify the insufficiency of workers for this position in the
United States and the lack of adverse effects on wages. 38 The court
rejected the INS's arguments that the Attorney General's general powers
allowed for independent review.
First, the INS argued that the Attorney General's administrative and
enforcement powers under section 103 allowed review of the Department of Labor's decision. 39 Section 103 charges the Attorney General
§ 656.10 (1983). Schedule B lists occupations for which a labor certification will not be issued.
20 C.F.R. § 656.11 (1983).
32. INA § 205, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1982).
33 .. See Joseph v. Landon, 679 F.2d 113, 116 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
34. See, e.g., Singh v. Attorney General, 510 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D.D.C. 1980), a/f'd mem.,
672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
35. See H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965); 111 CONG. REc. 21,579, 21,767
(1965).
36. 564 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
37. Id. at 425; see also INA§ 214(a)(l9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l9) (1982) (authorizing exclusion of aliens seeking to procure "a visa or other documentation, or seek[ing) to enter the United
States, by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact"). The court concluded that
the INS did not prove the element of willfulness. 564 F.2d at 434.
38. 564 F.2d at 424-25.
39. Id. at 423.
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"with the administration and enforcement of this Chapter and all other
laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens . . . .
[A] determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to
all questions of law shall be controlling. " 40 The court, however, held
that this specific power granted in section 212(a)(14) prevailed over
the general grant of power given to the Attorney General. 41 The court
acknowledged that it was the Labor Department's function to determine whether the alien's application satisfied the labor certification
requirements. 42 Therefore, the INS had to find some basis for ignoring the labor certification other than because it had its own views of
the standards required by section 212(a)(14). 43
The INS tried to persuade the court that section 221(h) gives the INS
final review over all issues concerning incoming aliens. Section 221(h)
says "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to entitle any alien, to
whom a visa or other documentation has been issued, to enter the United
States, if, upon arrival at a port of entry in the United States, he is
found to be inadmissible under this Chapter . . .. " 44 Although the
court recognized that the INS regularly exercised its power when reviewing the decisions of consular officials giving out United States visas
outside the country, 45 it concluded that when the INA specifically
delegated power to the. Secretary of Labor, the only determination the
INS could make was whether the Labor Department had issued the appropriate certification.
Just after Castaneda-Gonzalez was decided, the Labor Department
published new regulations providing that the INS or the consul could
invalidate a labor certification only if there were fraud or willful
misrepresentation of a material fact in the labor certification
application. 46 Although this language seemed to be consistent with the
decision in Castaneda- Gonzalez, other courts took up the issue of
authority to find aliens unqualified for certified labor. Recognizing
changes in the INA 47 and the unique factual circumstances of
40. INA § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
41. 564 F.2d at 423.
42. Id.
43. At the time Castadena-Gonzales arose, aliens entering from western hemisphere countries did not rely on the preference system, so the INS could not rely on its powers incident
to deciding preference classifications. This was changed by the Immigration & Nationality Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 4, 90 Stat. 2703, 2705 (1976).
44. INA § 22l(h), 8 U.S.C. § 120l(h) (1982).
45. Compare INA § 221, 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982) (issuance of visas by consular officers)
with INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (inspection by immigration officers) and INA § 236, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226 (exclusion of aliens).
46. See 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d) (1983).
47. See supra note 43. Once western hemisphere aliens enter this country through the preference
system, the INS can rely on its powers in §§ 203-204. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, at least one district court, in the District of Columbia, has recognized that
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Castaneda-Gonzales, 48 other courts invalidated labor certificates for
reasons other than fraud and misrepresentation.
2. Section 204 and the occupational preferences- The Ninth Circuit, in K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 49 explained the position of courts
that considered the INA and the preference system and concluded that
the INS could refuse to issue a visa to an unqualified sixth preference
alien. 50 The court concluded that the INS could not invalidate a Department of Labor certificate, but those certificates only included issues
the Labor Department properly had before it. Section 212(a)(14), the
source of the Department's power, delegated power to it, but only in
twc specific areas: availability of American workers and effect on
wages. 51 This interpretation is consistent with the INS's power under
section 204.
Section 204, outlining the INS's authority with regard to the
preference classifications, states, "[a]fter an investigation of the facts
in each case, and after consultation with the Secretary of Labor with
respect to petitions to accord a status under section 1153(a)(3) or
1153(a)(6) of this title [203(a)(3) or (6)), the Attorney General shall,
if he determines that the facts stated in the petition are true . . .
approve the petition. " 52 This section is more specific than 212(a)(14),
because it explains who is responsible for determining the truth of the
facts in the alien's petition, and explains the interrelated duties of the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor.
The preference situation is different than that raised in CastanedaGonzales because the INS's powers are broader and more specific when
considering visa petitions. Once the INS enters the picture to review
the petition for preference classification, sections 203(a) and 204(b)
of the INA authorize the INS to exercise its discretion. The court in
Castaneda-Gonzalez recognized this difference and acknowledged the
authority of the INS to determine whether the alien has qualified for
the preference requested 53 as well as the broader scope of authority
the INS enjoyed in preference determinations. 54

the Castaneda-Gonzales rule applies to the preference system. Singh v. Attorney General, 510
F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd mem., 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
48. Because Castaneda-Gonzales was not admitted through the preference system, the INS
was not refusing to admit him as a sixth preference alien. He was already in the country and
the INS was trying to deport him under § 24l(a)(l). The INS claimed he entered the country
without a visa, because the visa he had was inaccurate since it authorized him to accept a job
for which he was not qualified.
49. 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
50. Id. at 1009.
51. Id.
52. INA § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § l 154(b) (1982).
53. 564 F.2d at 428 & n.27.
54. Id. at 429.
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The division of authority requires clarification. The legislative history
and a reasonable reading of the relevant INA sections suggest that the
Labor Department's power is limited to the two issues enumerated in
section 212(a)(l4). The INS has the power to determine the truth of
facts on the visa applications. Nevertheless, some courts remain
unconvinced. 55 In this time of tight labor markets and immigration
reform, the legislature should recognize this ambiguity and determine
an answer.
B.

The Intent of the Alien Receiving the Labor Certification

Whoever determines the alien's qualifications for certified employment - the Attorney General through the INS or the Department of
Labor - must consider the alien's intent upon accepting the employment. For example, in Spyropou/os v. INS, 56 the controversy concerned
an alien's intention to assume the certified job." After receiving certification, but before arriving in the United States, Spyropoulos received
no response to his letters to his future employer in Washington, D.C.
He brought his family to Massachusetts, where they stayed with friends.
After another unsuccessful attempt to reach the employer, Spyropoulos
began working in Massachusetts at an uncertified job. The court held
the alien was properly inadmissible at the time of his entry because
he did not have the appropriate certification for the job that he took
in .Massachusetts. 58 The court recognized the difficulty in proving
whether the alien intended to work at the certified employment, 59 and
drew inferences from the alien's decision to enter the country even after
suspecting there were problems with the certified job, settling in
Massachusetts rather than Washington, D.C., making few attempts to
contact the certified employer, and settling quickly into an uncertified
job. 60 The Spyropoulos case illustrates the difficulties of courts and
aliens. How and why courts make these inferences and interpret the
facts before them can determine the outcome of the alien's case. There
has, however, been little scrutiny of the issues that commonly confront courts when they try to decide whether to allow an occupational
preference alien to stay in the United States even after he is not working at his certified job.
55. See Singh v. Attorney General, 510 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that the power
given the Secretary of Labor, along with the ambiguities in the legislative history, indicates the
INS could overrule the Labor Department only when the Department abused its discretion), aff'd
mem., 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
56. 590 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1978).
51. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id.
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1. Evidence of intent-Obviously, it is difficult for the INS to obtain
evidence of an alien's intent at the time the alien enters the United
States. The established rule is that if the alien does not take the certified job, he may be deported only if there is a finding that he obtained
his laboJ certification by fraud or that he never intended to take
the certified job when he entered the United States. 61 Therefore, if an
alien enters with the full intention of taking his certified employment,
he commits no fraud if the employment is no longer available and
he accepts other employment. 62
To implement this rule, courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) have developed two inferences when an alien not working
at certified employment claims he intended to take the certified job
but it was unavailable. First, when an alien begins work immediately
in an uncertified job, there is a strong inference that the alien did not
intend to take the certified position. 63 Second, the same intent may
be inferred when an alien finds out prior to entry that a certified job
is no longer available but enters the United States anyway. 64 The court
in Spyropoulos used both inferences to exclude the alien. 65
2. Length of employment at the certified job- There is no requirement that the alien remain permanently in the job for which he has
been certified. He must, however, intend to take the position for a
reasonable length of time, and the reasonableness of the employment
period must be determined in light of ''the interest served by the statute
and the interest in freedom to change employment.'' 66 There is nothing
to prevent an alien from changing employment to improve himself.
The question that normally arises is whether an alien disqualifies himself
from a labor certification if he intends at the time of his application
to remain at the certified job only for a temporary period until he
can do better.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Yui Sing Tse v. INS 61 illustrates the
opposing views on this issue. In this case, an alien obtained certification as a cook and intended to work in that capacity until he could
qualify as a dentist. The court weighed the interest protected by the

61. See Jang Man Cho v. INS, 669 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1982).
62. Id. at 940.
63. See In re Fotopoulos, 13 I. & N. Dec. 847 (BIA 1972); In re Santana, 13 I. & N. Dec.
362 (BIA 1969).
64. See In re Welcome, 13 I. & N. Dec. 352 (BIA 1969).
65. 590 F.2d at 4.
66. Yui Sing Tse v.- INS, 596 F.2d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1979). These interests are reflected
essentially in § 212(a)(l4) of the Act which addresses the availability of qualified workers and
the impact of alien workers on domestic wages and working conditions, and in § 2.03(a)(6) which
requires the alien to perform work "not of a temporary or seasonal nature." See 8 U.S.C. §§
1182(a)(l4), 1153(a)(6) (1982).
67. 596 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1979).
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INS - protecting American workers - with the alien's interest in obtaining "[t]he opportunity to earn a living, to improve his economic
circumstances, and to engage in common occupations, without
unreasonable limitation or invidious discrimination. " 68 Because the
alien's hopes of being a dentist could not be realized until the distant
future, the INS was being overly protective of the interests of American
workers. Furthermore, restricting job opportunities on. the basis of
alienage and freezing aliens in their .certified jobs raise substantial constitutional problems. 69 The court found no difficulty with the alien's
aspirations and upheld the certification.
Judge Wallace's dissent focused on the alien's intent at the time of
certification and found that the alien was interested in pursuing the
certified employment only until he could obtain other employment. 10
He said that the alien had "[t]he ultimate intent ... not to work as
a chinese food cook but to work as a dentist." 11 It depends, of course,
on what Judge Wallace meant by the alien's "ultimate intent."
Wallace's approach to this issue would disqualify many aliens who
have a bona fide intention of working at the certified employment but
who also have hopes of improving their economic situation or of pursuing further studies in their own self-interest. Therefore, it may be
misleading to suggest that an alien has obtained a labor certificate for
only temporary employment 12 when he intends at the time of -entry
to assume his certified position, at least for a period of time that is
reasonable in light of the statutory interests to be served. In terms of
the statutory interests, there is a question of the availability of workers
and the adverse affect of employing the alien.
Furthermore, the certified employment should be more than temporary or seasonal in nature, but this does not mean that the alien must
remain permanently in the original certified job. These statutory interests do not require the immigrant to ignore his future or to commit
himself irrevocably to his certified employment. It is relevant that the
alien should have some bona fide intent to remain with his employment for some reasonable length of time. To require any further commitment would be to impose an unreasonable restraint on the alien
that is not normally required of others. 73
68. Id. at 834.
69. Id. at 835.
70. Id. at 837 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. The immigrant alien must be coming to the United States to perform work not of a
temporary nature. INA § 203(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § I 153(a)(6) (1982). However, that is not to say
that he must remain in the position permanently.
73. See 596 F.2d at 835 (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)) for the
constitutional issues that might arise if the alien was required to remain permanently in the certified employment.
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3. Licensed professions- If an alien is a licensed professional and
the job certification requires a license for those pursuing this profession, then he must obtain the necessary license within a reasonable
period of time. A good example of the licensing requirement came in
Madany v. Smith, 14 where a nurse was certified for a job in the United
States on the condition that she "[b]e able to obtain, or already have,
a Virginia nursing license."" The alien argued that the language "able
to obtain" was synonymous with "eligible to sit" for the examination. 76
The court held that mere eligibility to sit for the examination was not
enough to fulfill the certification requirement. The alien also had to
demonstrate an ability to pass the examination. 77 For example, the alien
could demonstrate this ability with proof of passing a similar exam
or having enrolled in preparatory courses for the examination. Once
the alien satisfied this showing of probable success, it would be an
abuse of discretion for the INS to deny a preference petition. 78
4. Business investor status- Aliens who want to immigrate to the
United States as professionals, 79 skilled or unskilled workers, 80 or nonpreference immigrants 81 require a labor certification. An alien does not
require a labor certification if he seeks a visa as a business investor. 82
Although the business investor exemption has undergone some change
in recent times, the basic objective is the same: to avoid competition
with Americans for skilled and unskilled positions while stimulating
investment in the United States.
Prior to 1973 the regulations did not mandate a labor certification
if an alien invested a substantial amount of capital in a commercial
or agricultural enterprise. 83 Eventually the BIA thought it necessary
to impose two alternative requirements to buttress the ''substantial investment" stipulation. In In re Heitland, 84 it explained that the investment (1) "[m]ust tend to expand job opportunities" or (2) "[b]e of

74. 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
75. Id. at 1010.
76. Id. at 1013.
77. Id. at 1014.
78. See In re Kuo, 15 I. & N. Dec. 650 (BIA 1976) (nurse did not seek to qualify as a professional but worked at unrelated occupations). But cf Navarro v. District Director of INS, 562
F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1977) (INS had no authority to revoke alien's preference visa because she
failed to get nursing license with two years), vacated, 514 F.2d 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 861 (1978).
79. INA § 203(a)(3), 8 U .S.C. § ll53(a)(3) (1982).
80. INA § 203(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1982).
SL INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1982).
82. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 19,157 (1983).
83. See 31 Fed. Reg. 10,021 (1966).
84. 14 I. & N. Dec. 563 (BIA 1974), aff'd, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
819 (1977).
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an amount adequate to insure, with sufficient certainty, that the alien's
primary function with respect to the investment, and with respect to
the economy, will not be as_ a skilled or unskilled laborer." 8 ' Even
after a 1973 amendment became more specific by requiring a $10,000
investment and a minimum of one year's experience, 86 the INS still
thought it defensible to adhere to the additional alternatives set down
in In re Heitland. 87 It was not long before an issue was raised concerning the legitimacy of the BIA's imposing these Heitland criteria. Not
only did they cause confusion for alien investors, but they resulted
in an "[i]mproper circumvention of rule-making procedure. " 88
When the INS amended the business investor exemption again in
1976, it implemented the basic concepts of the Heitland formula. 89 The
adequacy of the investment is ensured by virtue of the high minimum
investment amount, and the enterprise must offer employment for at
least one person exclusive of the alien and his immediate family.
There is a question whether an alien who intends to practice his
profession in the United States may qualify as a business investor.
More specifically, can the regulations keep the alien from working
in his own enterprise? It is clear that the exception was intended
to prevent the entrepreneur from competing with his skills against
American workers. 90
Because the Heitland test is met if the investment accomplishes either
of the two objectives, it seems the alien should be able to work in
the enterprise if the net effect is "to expand job opportunities
. . . or . . . to insure . . . that the alien's primary function
. . . will not be as a skilled or unskilled laborer." 91 If the alien's
"price'-' for entering the job market is a substantial investment, and
the investment expands job opportunities for others, then it would
seem that the statutory mandate is fulfilled even if the alien himself
is licensed to work in the enterprise. The new version of the statute
follows this interpretation by requiring that the business employ at
least one person who is a United States citizen or a lawful permanent
resident. 92

85. Id. at 567.
86. 38 Fed. Reg. 1380 (1973).
87. See Bahat v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1981); Ruangswang v. INS, 591 F.2d 39
(9th Cir. 1978).
88. Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 1980). A 1972 amendment had imposed requirements similar to the Heitland criteria but was rejected. 37 Fed. Reg. 23,274 (1972).
89. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1983), amended by 48 Fed. Reg. 19,157 (1983).
90. See In re Heitland, 14 I. & N. Dec. 563, 567 (BIA 1974), aff'd, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
91. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 567.
92. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1983).
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LABOR CERTIFICATION' EMPWYMENT' AND ADJUSTMENT OF
STATUS

Under section 245, a nonirnmigrant may obtain. employment in the
United States by applying for adjustment of status to that of a lawful
permanent resident while he is in the United States. 93 This provision
allows an alien to remain in the country while his application for permanent residence is pending. If the alien accepts unauthorized employment prior to filing his application, however, he will be unable to adjust his status. 94 This provision denying the alien the opportunity to
adjust his status if he engages in unauthorized employment was intended to protect the American labor force from the unfair competition of nonimmigrant aliens who violate their status by working. 95 If
an alien obtains labor certification, files for adjustment, and then goes
to work before the approval of the adjustment application, he will not
be penalized. Even if the alien takes a position with an employer other
than the employer who certified the alien, there is no penalty under
section 245. 96
Even if the adjustment application is denied, the alien can renew
it at the deportation hearing 97 and the application for adjustment at
the deportation proceeding is regarded as a renewed application rather
than a new submission. 98 The labor certification remains valid at the
deportation hearing as long as the employer still intends to hold the
job open and the alien intends to work for the employer. 99 The mere
fact that the alien has stopped working for the employer while his adjustment application is pending does not necessarily result in an abandonment of his adjustment application. The issue in these cases depends
on whether the parties intend to continue the employment relationship.
Immigration officials and courts have had difficulty in deciding
whether a self-employed alien is involved in unauthorized employment.
The BIA originally ruled that self-employment is still unauthorized
employment. 100 This was not surprising, for the BIA took a rather tradi-

93. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982).
94. INA-§ 245(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1982); 2 C. GoRDON & H. RosENFIELD, supra note
28, at § 7. 7(b).
95; Pei-Chi Tien v. INS, 638 F.2d 1324, 1329 (5th Cir. 1981); H.R. REP. No. 1553, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNo. & Ao. NEWS 6073, 6084.
96. INA § 245(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1982); see Pei-Chi Tien, 638 F.2d at 1329.
97. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(4) (1983).
98. See Ka Fung Chan v. INS, 634 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Huang, 16 I. & N. Dec.
362.l (BIA 1978).
99. Pei-Chi Tien v. INS, 638 F.2d 1324, 1328 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Yui Sing Tse v. INS,
596 F.2d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1979); 8 C.F.R. § 204.4(b) (1983).
100. See In re Tong, 16 I. & N. Dec. 593 (BIA 1978); see also In re Hall, I. & N. Int.
Dec. 2897 (Feb. 4, 1982) (alien's activities as fundraiser for church were unauthorized employment).
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tional view of the meaning of "employment" 101 and left little room
for innovative interpretation. More recently, the BIA found a difference
between unauthorized employment and self-employment in In re Lett102
and did not apply section 245(c) to an alien who qualified for adjustment as a non preference business investor.
The BIA's conclusion in In re Lett may be explained in part by the
presumption that an alien's business investment provides opportunities
for American workers and, therefore, it would be consistent with the
policy underlying section 245(c) to construe "unauthorized employment"
in this way. Therefore, the BIA seems to put a premium on an alien's
compliance with the business investor requirements if an alien expects
to avoid the strictures of section 245.
One might wonder, though, what would happen to an alien who
engages in activities that qualify him for the nonpreference investment
category but who then applies for adjustment as a preference immigrant.
If such activities precede the alien's filing for adjustment, there is little
reason for denying adjustment on those grounds if the true statutory
intent is to protect the American labor market.
According to one decision, a self-employed alien was granted an adjustment of status, despite his self-employment and his failure to meet
the requirements of a business investor. In Bhakta v. INS, 103 the Ninth
Circuit reversed a BIA decision denied adjustment of status by recognizing that the alien's management of his own motel investment did not
reduce the number of jobs for citizens or lawful permanent residents
in the United States. 104 Thus, for section 245(c) purposes, this was not
unauthorized employment, and it did not matter that the alien's enterprise had not satisfied the nonpreference investor requirements. 105
The Bhakta decision seems to undermine the purpose of limiting the
classification of business investors. If an investor-manager falls short
of the regulatory requirements applicable to the investor classification,
he should still be subject to the labor certification requirement and
should be regarded as engaged in unauthorized employment. The Bhakta
court seemed confident ih distinguishing the case of an alien professional because the professional "competes directly with all other professionals similarly employed in such practice." 106 But an alien investor
who has not quite met the statutory requirement for a business in101. The BIA said that the term " 'employment' is a common one, generally used with relation to the most common pursuits, and therefore ought to be received as understood in common
parlance." In re Tong, 16 I. & N. Dec. 593, 595 (BIA 1978).
102. 17 I. & N. Dec. 312, 313 (BIA 1980).
103. 667 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1981). Bhakta applied for a fifth preference visa but could not
qualify as a business investor because he lacked the experience required by the regulations. The
BIA denied the application on the ground that the alien was engaged in unauthorized employment.
104. 667 F.2d at 773.
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Yiu Tsang Cheung v. District Director, 641 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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vestor is still protected even though he competes with others in the
marketplace who may have been held to strict compliance because their
visas depended on it. If the "unauthorized employment" bar to adjustment is intended to protect the American labor market, then there
is no guarantee of protection if adjustment is available to those who
approach, but do not quite reach, the investment standard.
In view of the court's novel approach in Bhakta, it was not surprising that other aliens would want to use that decision to rid themselves
of the "unauthorized employment" label. In Wettasinghe v. INS, 101
the Sixth Circuit sought to distinguish Bhakta. W ettasinghe was a
student attempting to avoid a departure order alleging he violated his
student status by working. The court observed that the regulations prohibited a student from working without permission ·' 'either for an
employer or independently." 108 The court interpreted this to mean "selfemployment by students as well as employment by another." 109 The
adjustment provision does not contain such language. Instead, the statute
denies the adjustment privilege to an alien who "accepts"
employment, 110 and the implementing regulation denies it to one who
accepts "unauthorized employment." 111 Thus there is continuing doubt
because a self-employed investor really does not "accept" employment
from anyone.
The current immigration reform movement should consider this ambiguity. The lack of a definition of "unauthorized employment" has
created controversy among the courts and decisions contrary to the
policies of the employment-related provisions of the INA.
III.

LIMITING THE REACH OF EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION

There is some concept in the INA that, after a certain time, mistakes
committed by the alien should not result in deportation. This is not
uniformly the case, however, and through two doctrines - the lack
of a statute of limitation for grounds of deportation and the reentry
doctrine - the INS is virtually unlimited in how far it can look into
an alien's past to find acts which can result in exclusion or deportation.

A.

Absence of a Statute of Limitatio,ns for the
Grounds of Deportation

There are basically two ways for an alien to become a lawful perma107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

702
702
Id.
See
See

F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1983).
F.2d at 642 (citing 8 C.F.R.

§

214.2(f)(6) (1982)).

INA § 245(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1982).
8 C.F.R. § 245.l(a) (1983).
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nent resident of the United States. An alien may obtain an immigrant
visa at a consulate abroad 112 or, if he is already in the United States
· as a nonimmigrant, he may adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. 113 Although adjustment of status is a convenient
mechanism for the alien, the Attorney General may rescind an alien's
adjusted status within five years if it appears to his satisfaction that
the alien was not in fact eligible for the adjustment. 114 There is no
corresponding statute of limitations for the deportation statute. 115
I. Adopting a statute of limitations for all but serious deportable
acts- The absence of such a statute of limitations is quite threatening
to aliens. It simply means that a deportable alien is always subject
to expulsion no matter how long he has lived in the United States.
Although deportation is civil in nature, 116 it is sometimes said that the
criminal law provides a good basis of analogy for supporting a statute
of limitations in the deportation context. 111 Although deportation is
not "punishment," it can mean sacrificing the efforts of a lifetime
and abandoning family and friends. 118
As a compromise between the government's interests and the alien's
interests, the INA could provide a statute of limitations for all but
the most serious grounds of deportation. Obviously there will be differences of opinion on what constitutes serious grounds for deportation, but one would certainly ·include threats to national security, 119
drug trafficking, 120 and persecution of others. 121 Immigration law, at
a minimum, should protect from the limitless applications of the depor112. See INA § 22I(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1982).
113. See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1982). This adjustment provision was enacted
so that a nonimmigrant would not have to go to the trouble and expense of leaving the United
States in order to become a lawful permanent resident. See H. REP. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 128, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1653. See generally INA§ IOl(a)(20),
8 U.S.C. § I IOl(a)(20) (1982) (defining term "lawfully admitted for permanent residence").
114. INA § 246(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1982).
115. See Oloteo v. INS, 643 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981); Fulgencio v. INS, 573 F.2d 596,
598 (9th Cir. 1978); In re S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 548, 553 (AG 1962); IA C. GORDON & H. RosEN·
FIELD, supra note 28, at § 4.6b·.
116. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
supra note 28, at § 4.lc.
117. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 281 (some commissioners supported.the concept that
"the government should take action against an individual within a certain specified period of
time following the commission of a deportable offense, or not at all").
118. See Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963) ("deportation is a drastic
sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families"); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 39 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("Deportation is a sanction which in severity surpasses all but the most Draconian
criminal penalties."); Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. I, 19 (1975) (advocating statute of limitations because of "compelling humanitarian
concerns developed by aliens during long residence in this country, included family ties, economic
interests, and deep roots in the community").
119: INA § 241(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6) (1982).
120. INA § 24l(a)(l1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l1) (1982).
121. INA § 241(a)(I9), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l9) (1982).
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tation provisions those aliens who pose no real threat to society. 122
This would not be a new policy judgment since the INA already makes
such distinctions elsewhere. 123 It would be merely a question of transferring the concept to a provision dealing with a statute of limitations.
2. Adopting a statute of limitations to equalize rescission and deportation procedures- Another aspect of this problem of no statute of
limitations on deportation actions occurs when the INS tries to deport ·
an alien who has adjusted his status. If a nonimmigrant adjusts his
status and the INS wishes to take action against the alien after the
five-year statute of limitations has expir~d, it can proceed through deportation rather than rescission of the status adjustment.
The possibility for inconsistent results was made clear in In re
Belenzo. 124 The alien there adjusted his status in 1972 on the basis of
an invalid marriage. More than five years later, the INS felt it was
too late for a rescission proceeding but subjected Mr. Belenzo to deportation proceedings because he had left the country after his adjustment of permanent status and the INS deemed him excludable upon
his return as a result of a fraudulent adjustment of status. 125 Both the
immigration judge and the BIA found in favor of the alien on the
theory that it was too late for his status to be affected by rescission
and therefore by deportation. The BIA certified the case to the Attorney
General for review• 2 ~ and the Attorney General reversed the BIA's
decision. 121
The Attorney General seemed convinced that rescission was meant
to be an informal and expeditious procedure and that Congress wanted
to put a time limit on the availability of that procedure. 128 But under
that construction, the statute of limitations for rescission has little mean122. It has been suggested that there be a ten-year statute of limitations, but that no statute
of limitations be applied to deportation based on conviction for a crime which is not subject
to a statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1982) (capital offenses). See Joint Hearings,
supra note 8, at 289 (prepared statement of David Carliner); see also FINAL REPORT, supra note
7, at 280 (some commissioners supported statute of limitations for deportation against longterm permanent residents, except in cases of heinous crimes).
The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy could not reach a consensus on
the application of a statute of limitations to deportation proceedings. See FINAL REPORT, supra
note 7, at 279. One commissioner thought that a statute of limitations should not apply to deportation because deportation is not a penalty but represents a judgment that certain aliens are
currently undesirable residents. See id. at 407 (supplemental statement of Commissioner Simpson).
123. See, e.g., INA§ 24l(f), 8 U.S.C. § 125l(f) (1982); INA§ 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
124. 17 I. & N. Dec. 374 (BIA 1981).
125. The INS charged the alien with deportability under § 24l(a)(l) because at the time of
entry he was excludable under§ 212(a)(l4) for lacking a labor certification and under § 212(a)(l9)
for obtaining documentation by fraud. Id. at 374.
126. The Board must refer to the Attorney General for review of all cases which "the Commission requests be referred to the Attorney General for review." 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(h)(l)(iii) (1983).
127. 17 I. & N. Dec. 374, 380 (AG 1981).
128. 17 I. & N. Dec. at 382-83 (quoting In re S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 548, 555 n.8 (AG 1962)).
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ing if the Attorney General can still revert to the deportation proceeding
after the five-year period has elapsed. The five-year limitations period
should apply to any fraud in connection with the adjustment of the
alien's status and deportation should not be entertained as a substitute
mechanism once the five-year period has passed.
Section 246 provides that when rescission occurs, the alien shall be
subject thereafter to all provisions of the INA as if there had been
no adjustment of status. 129 This suggests that the alien reverts to the
status which existed prior to his adjustment and, therefore, if rescission is foreclosed because of the expiration of the statutory period,
then the statute should be interpreted to foreclose his return to a status
which would subject him to the deportation provision. 130
In addition, there seems to be little support for the position that
rescission was intended to be an informal procedure designed for the
Attorney General's quick action. If there was any thought of summary action, it would certainly be dispelled by the statutory requirement that for those aliens adjusted under section 244 of the INA after
suspension of deportation, Congress would have to pass a resolution
withdrawing that suspension. 131 Section 246 also contains this requirement and, therefore, there is little evidence that this procedure was
meant merely as an alternative procedure for terminating the alien's
lawful permanent residence. As a matter of fact, in O/oteo v. INS the
court referred to the INS's concession that "the five-year limitation
in Section 246(a) is a historical anomaly or the result of an accident
in the legislative process." 132

3. Applying the statute of limitations fairly in rescission
proceedings- Section 246(a) requires rescission if "it shall appear to
the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the person was not in
fact eligible for such adjustment of status.'' 133 At what point is the
Attorney General to be satisfied about the alien's ineligibility? Must
the Attorney General issue a final order for rescission within the fiveyear period or does the mere institution of rescission proceedings suffice to toll the statute of limitation? The issue arose in Zaoutis v.

129. Section 246(a) states that after rescission the alien "shall thereupon be subject to aH
provisions of this Chapter to the same extent as if the adjustment of status had not been made."
8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1982). Thus, deportation does not necessarily follow rescission. See 17 I.
& N. Dec. 374, 378 (BIA 1980).
130. See 17 I. & N. Dec. at 378-79.
131. Section 244(c)(2) provides that one house of Congress can veto the suspension of deportation granted to an alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1983). However, in INS v. Chadha, 103 S.
Ct. 2764 (1983), Congress held this veto power unconstitutional.
132. 643 F.2d 679, 683 n.8 (1981). Earlier deportation statutes contained statutes of limitation. A proposed amendment of the 1952 Act would have added a five-year statute of limitations
for deporting aliens, but it was rejected. See S. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1950).
133. INA § 246(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1982).
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Kiley, 134 where the alien argued that a mere notice of intent to rescind
did not comply with the statutory requirement that ''it shall appear
to the satisfaction of the Attorney General'' that the alien was ineligible for the adjustment of status.
The court held that when the Attorney General, acting through the
INS, institutes rescission proceedings in good faith on the basis of
evidence which would reasonably suggest a basis for rescission, the
Attorney General's satisfaction has been met under the statute. 135
After all, if the determination about the Attorney General's satisfaction was made only after a final order by the BIA, then this could
provide an incentive for the alien to prolong the proceedings in order
to get the benefit of the delay. On the other hand, this interpretation
protects the government's interests by recognizing the commencement
of proceedings as the time tolling the statute of limitations, thus avoiding
the compulsion to enter a rescission or(Jer before the five-year period
expires.1 36 The court also held that proceedings instituted and then
dropped, before the five-year statute .runs, do not toll the statute for
subsequent proceedings if the INS brought the original proceedings
in bad faith, or based its claim on speculation.1 37
B.

The Reentry Doctrine

The reentry doctrine applies the exclusion provisions to any alien,
including a lawful permanent resident, who is returning to the United
States after a temporary visit abroad. The doctrine is far reaching and
has caused mischief over the years. An alien who has been admitted
for permanent residence may live here for years without difficulty. If
he goes across the border to Mexico and commits an offense, he may
find himself unable to gain readmission to the United States.1 38
There is also the possibility that an alien may commit an offense
or become bankrupt or do. a number of things while he is living in
the United States which are not serious enough to warrant deportation

134. 558 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1977).
135. Id. at 1100.
136. Id. at 1101; accord Singh v. INS, 456 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847
(1972).
137. The coun distinguished Quintana v. Holland, 255 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1958), where the
INS filed a notice of intent to rescind but then dropped the case after it was unable to obtain
s_ufficient proof to sustain the charges. After the five-year statute of limitations had run, the
INS then reopened the case and ordered rescission. The court in Zaoutis recognized that the
Quintana court was correct in holding that the INS had failed to comply with the statute of
limitations because the decision to issue that rescission notice was based on speculation rather
than fact and that therefore a prima facie case was not made out. 558 F.2d at 1101.
138. The complication is caused by the definition of "entry" which covers any coming of
an alien into the United States. See INA § IOl(a)(l3), 8 U.S.C. § l lOl(a)(l3) (1982).
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but which would render him excludable as an initial immigrant. 139 If
that alien leaves and then seeks to return, the same rules of admission
apply that applied on the initial entry. This is because an ''entry'' is
regarded as "any coming of an alien into the United States." 140
· The Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 141 provided some relief
from this reentry doctrine. The Court held that a lawful permanent
resident who makes a trip abroad that is ''innocent, casual and brief''
will not be subject to the exclusion provisions ~n his return because
he will not be making an "entry." 142 As one might have guessed, the
Court's application of the reentry doctrine to permanent residents did
not solve all the problems because the lower courts then had to determine when a trip was "innocent, casual and brief." 143 An alien who
prepared too much for his trip ran the risk of his trip not being casual; 144
one who wandered too far afield might find that his excursion was
not brief enough. 145 Although the courts are gaining experience interpreting this exception to the reentry doctrine, the rules are not clear,
and aliens still risk exclusion following long residence in the United
States, based on activity that could not have resulted in deportation.
It was not surprising, therefore, that there would be agitation for
some change in the application of the reentry doctrine. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.heard some concerns about
the present problems in this area and recommended that the reentry
doctrine itself be modified. 146 Such a modification would result in the
application of the doctrine to returning permanent residents only in
very limited circumstances. 147 That seems preferable to dealing with
further clarification of the elements that comprise an ''innocent, casual
and brief" trip.
139. Compare INA§ 212(a)(I0), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(I0) (1982) (alien excludable for conviction of two or more offenses regardless of moral turpitude) with INA § 24l(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ 125l(a)(4) (1982) (alien deportable for conviction of crime~involving moral turpitude). An alien
is excludable if he is likely to become a public charge, INA§ 212(a)(l5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l5)
(1982), but he is not deportable if he becdmes a public charge for reasons arising after his entry,
INA § 24l(a)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 125l(a)(8) (1982).
140. See INA § IOl(a)(l3), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l3) (1982).
141. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
142. Id. at 461-62.
143. See Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979); Longoria-Castenada
v. INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 853 (1977); Vargas-Banuelos v. INS,
466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972).
144. See Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
145. See Mamanee v. INS, 566 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1977) (alien's entire family left
United States for indefinite time); Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974) (return
after 27-day trip abroad. resulted in entry).
146. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 284. The Commissioner recommended that returning lawful permanent residents not be subject to the exclusion laws, except the following: criminal
grounds, political grounds, entry without inspection, and engaging in persecution.
147. See id.
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FRAUD OR WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATION UNDER
SECTION

2l2(a)(19)

An alien is excludable, 148 and therefore deportable, if he procures
or has sought to procure a visa or seeks to enter the United States
by fraud~ or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact. 149 An alien
makes a willful misrepresentation when he makes an intentional, false
statement. Motivation is irrelevant in this respect. 150 There is no requirement, therefore, that the INS show the alien's intent to deceive
as long as it can prove that the alien made a statement knowing it
to be false. 151

A.

Materiality of the Misrepresentation

The misrepresentation must also concern a material fact. A misstatement that has nothing to do with the alien's admission is not relevant
to a determination of exclusion and deportation. There is difference
of opinion, though, about what constitutes materiality. Some courts
find materiality if the alien's misstatement prevents the INS or the consul
from conducting an· investigation into legitimate matters affecting the
issuance of the visa. 1 52 Other courts hold a misstatement material if
the truth might have resulted in a denial of the visa. 153
In Chaunt v. United States, 154 the Supreme Court provided some
guidance on this question of materiality, but in a proceeding to revoke
an alien's citizenship. The Court said that facts are material which (1)
"if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship," or (2) "might
have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery
of other facts warranting denial of citizenship. "ISS
In Fedorenko v. United States, 156 the Court used an approach similar
to the first part of the Chaunt test. 157 Fedorenko was.a concentration
148. See INA § 212(a)(l9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l9) (1982).
149. See INA § 24l(a)(l), 8 U.S.C .. § 1251(a)(l) (1982).
150. See In re Kai Hing Hui, 15 I. & N. Dec. 288 (BIA 1975); In re S- & B-C-, 9 I.
& N. Dec. 436,444 (AG 1961); IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 28, § 4.7c, at 4-58.
151. See Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Espinoza-Espinoza v. INS,
554 F.2d 921 · (9th Cir. 1977); IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 28, § 4.7c, at 4-58.
152. See Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966); Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d
642 (1st Cir. 1961).
153. See La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rossi,
299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962).
154. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
155. Id. at 355.
156. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
157. Technically, the Court did not apply the Chaunt test because it decided to settle Fedorenko
by a straightforward reliance on the alien's ineligibility for a visa under the Displaced Persons
Act. The Court thought it unnecessary to resolve the question about the application of the Chaunt
test to misrepresentations during visa issuance. Id. at 508-09, 516. Since the alien did not qualify
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camp guard during World War II and lied about his whereabouts during the war to enter the United States under the Displaced Persons
Act. The alien's truthful answer would have disqualified him for a
visa. In interpreting the Displaced Persons Act, the Court upheld the
circuit court's decision to revoke Fedorenko's citizenship. Had the Court
addressed the materiality question, it would have been forced to deal
with the effect of material misrepresentations in the visa issuance process; The alien obtained his visa by providing inaccurate information
about his background. In cases like Fedorenko, the decision about
material misrepresentations should be concerned, therefore, with what
occurred at the visa stage. If the INS seeks the alien's denaturalization
on the basis of material misstatements in the application for citizenship, then there is a basis for applying the strict test laid down in Chaunt
before the alien's citizenship can be withdrawn.
If the INS bases its case on the alien's material misrepresentations
at the visa stage, the Chaunt test should not be applied. The decision
about materiality should be based on the context in which the alien
gives his answers, not on the potential damage which such answers
might cause when the alien seeks a later benefit on the basis of his
admission. Justice White's dissent favored a remand for a review of
the alien's concealment at the citizenship application stage. 158 He must
have thought that different considerations applied in determining
materiality in a visa application and materiality in an application for
citizenship.
Although the Court in Chaunt provided a test for materiality in the
denaturalization context, it is obvious that the test is not a model of
clarity. 159 Although the Court had a chance to clarify the Chaunt test,
it avoided the issue by settling for another disposition of the question
before it. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, however, may aid
in interpreting the status of the INA's "material misrepresentation"
provisions. He suggested that the Chaunt test may be satisfied in either
of two ways. First, facts are material if, known by government officials, they would have justified denial of eligibility. Second, facts are
also material if they might have been useful to an investigation resulting
in other facts that warranted denial of citizenship. Thus in either case,
there must be proof of actual disqualifying facts. 160 This stringent test
is justified on the basis of the interest to be protected in denaturalizafor admission under the Displaced Persons Act because of his willful misrepresentation, Pub.
L. No. 80-774, § IO, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1948), the court relied on the statutory ground that
his naturalization was illegally procured under INA § 340(a), 8 U.S.C § 145l(a). 449 U.S. at
514-16, 518.
158. 449 U.S. at 528 (White, J., dissenting).
159. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 528 (1981) (White, J. dissenting) (disagreeing
with the district court's interpretation of the Chaunt test, United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F.
Supp. 893, 915-16 (S.D. Fla. 1978)); United States v. Shestawy, 714 F.2d 1038 (10th Cir. 1983).
160. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 524 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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tion cases. The alien must feel secure with his acquisition of citizenship and his citizenship should be taken away only on a clear and convincing showing that the alien has never met the prescribed statutory
conditions. 161
When materiality affects the visa process, however, the interest to
be protected is not as great as in the case of denaturalization. Therefore,
it is understandable that the Attorney General opted in In re S- &
B-C- 162 for an approach that considered whether the misrepresentation shut off a line of inquiry that might have resulted in the alien's
exclusion. 163 This gives proper weight to the excludability provision
because the alien could be refused admission not only if he is excludable
on the "true facts," but also if his false statements led the consul astray,
thus denying the latter the opportunity of making a· full inquiry concerning the alien's application. 16 ' The BIA has clarified this by stating
that after the INS shows that the authorities might have developed
eno_ugh facts possibly leading to the denial of a visa or entry~ the burden
then shifts to the alien to show that he could not be excluded. 165
B.

Misrepresentation and Marriage

Many of the problems concerning fraud or misrepresentation have
to do with marriages. Section 24l(c) of the INA creates a presumption
that a marriage is fraudulent, if it is terminated either by divorce or
annulment, within two years after the alien's entry, unless the alien
can show there was no intention to evade the immigration laws.1 66 The
rationale for this provision is to create a deterrent against an alien's
entry into the United States on the basis of a sham relationship. 167
If an alien does not have a valid, unexpired immigrant visa, he will
be excludable at entry. 168 Therefore, if an alien seeks entry on the basis
of a marital relationship, the termination of that relationship before
the alien's entry will render the alien excludable, and even if entry is
secured, will render the alien deportable. 169 Mere withdrawal of a petition to grant an alien immigrant status, however, will not affect the
alien's admissibility unless the government informs the alien prior to
161. Id. at 525.
162. 9 I. & N. Dec. 436, 444 (AG 1961).
163. Id. at 447.
164. See In re NG, 17 I. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1980); In re Bosuego, 17 I. & N. Dec. 125
(BIA 1980).
165. See In re Bosuego, 17 I. & N. Dec. 125, 131 (BIA 1980).
166. INA § 24l(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1982).
167. See S. REP. No. 1137, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1952); IA C. GoRDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 28, at § 4.7(d).
168. INA § 212(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1982).
,.
169. See Chan v. INS, 629 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1980) (marriage annulled before entry and
therefore alien is deportable even if unaware of annulment).
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his departure for the United States that the petition has been
withdrawn. 110 The relationship between the alien and the petitioner must
still exist at the time of admission. 111 This policy avoids the hardship
that might otherwise ensue if the alien were forced to return to his
homeland even though he was unaware of any visa problems prior to
his departure.
1. Change in marital status- Occasionally an alien's status may
change and he is no longer entitled to the type of visa which the consul issued to him. In such a case, the alien is excludable for not having
a valid visa. It does not matter that the alien is not advised prior to
his departure for the United States that his visa has been revoked.
This was readily brought out in In re Alarcon. 112 In that case the
alien obtained her visa as the unmarried daughter of a lawful permanent resident when in fact she was married. The alien argued that she
had a valid immigrant visa when she entered because the visa was not
revoked in time. The BIA held that even if revocation was not effective, the INS still had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the visa
by determining whether the underlying relationship between the parties still existed. In Alarcon the alien was no longer unmarried and
.thus was not entitled to the classification accorded to an unmarried
daughter of a lawful permanent resident. 173 This was the feature that
distinguished the case from In re Salazar, 174 for in Salazar the alien
was still married to a United States citizen who had previously petitioned for him. Therefore, there was no change in the relationship which
was the basis for issuing the visa, and thus, no grounds for exclusion.
2. Retroactive annulment of marriage- If an alien obtains entry
as a result of a misrepresentation that he is unmarried or that he was
not previously married, he cannot avoid deportation by seeking to make
the annulment of his marriage retroactive. 175 This policy assures that
aliens will not profit from changes in marital status that are not bona
fide. 176 On the other hand, the annulment of an alien's marriage will
not be given retroactive effect if to do so would result in a "gross
miscarriage of justice." 111 It has been the BIA's policy that "annul-

170. INA§ 206, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1982).
171. See In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec. 167 (BIA 1979).
172. 17 I. & N. Dec. 574 (BIA 1980).
173. The alien was entitled to a second preference visa. See INA § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1153(a)(2) (1982).
174. 17 I. & N. Dec. 167 (BIA 1979).
175. See Hendrix v. INS, 583 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir.- 1978); In re Magana, 17 I. & N. Dec.
111 (BIA 1979); In re Wong, 16 I. & N. Dec. 87 (BIA 1977).
176. Hendrix v. INS, 583 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978).
177. In re Castillo-Sedano, 15 I. & N. Dec. 445,446 (BIA 1975) (default decree of annulment
was secured by applicant's wife and no fraud was involved; therefore, relation-back doctrine
would result in miscarriage of justice if applicant was excluded from United States); cf In re
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ment decrees may have different effects depending on the nature of
the case and the purposes to be served by giving an annulment decree
retroactive effect." 178
C.

Waiver of Fraud

An alien whose deportation hinges on his excludability at entry
because of fraud may seek relief from deportation under section 241(0
if he is the spouse, child, or parent of a United States citizen or of
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 179 Before 1981, 180
the waiver was automatic but the INS sometimes sidestepped the waiver
by charging the alien not only with fraud, 181 but with other violations ·
such as failure to obtain a labor certification, 182 or a valid immigrant
visa. 183 The courts allowed the INS to become successful with this tactic, consistently holding that the section 241(0 waiver could not be applied to a charge which did not sound in fraud. Obviously this frustrated
aliens who, under normal circumstances, would qualify for this relief
because of the necessary family relationship.
The interpretation of section 241(0 took on real significance in INS
v. Errico. 184 The aliens in that case had obtained a quota advantage
on the basis of misrepresentations, but the INS instituted deportation
proceedings against them on the basis of section 241(a)(l), alleging that
they were not "otherwise admissible" because of their failure to comply with the quota provisions. 185 The Court decided that the aliens were
in fact "otherwise admissible" within the meaning of section 241(0.
The Court looked to· the predecessor of section 241(0, section 7 of
Astorga, 17 I. & N. Dec. I (BIA 1979) (alien's prior marriage declared invalid and therefore
does not affect present marriage for purposes of visa petition because by his first marriage alien
did not evade immigration laws and present marriage is bona fide).
178. 17 I. & N. Dec. at 4. Compare Hendrix v. INS, 583 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1978) (marriage
annulled will not relate back to ground of exclusion or deportation if alien enters on the basis
of not being married); In re Wong, 16 I. & N. Dec. 87 (BIA 1977) (same); In re Castillo-Sedano,
15 I. & N. Dec. 445 (BIA 1975) (annulment will not relate back where there was not immigration
fraud and injustice would result) and In re R-J-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 182 (BIA 1956) with In
re Samedi, 14 I. & N. Dec. 625 (BIA 1974) (annulment retroactive) and In re T-, 3 I. & N.
Dec. 528, 530-31 (BIA 1949) (same).
179. See INA § 241(f)(l)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 125l(f)(l)(A)(i) (1982).
180. The 1981 amendments changed the language of section 241(f) so that the waiver is left
to the discretion of the Attorney General. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 8, 95 Stat. 1611, 1616.
181. See INA § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l9) (1982).
182. See INA § 212(a)(14), 8 U,S.C. § 1182(a)(l4) (1982).
183. See INA § 212(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1982).
184. 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
185. At the time of the E"ico case there was a quota system. See Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, §§ 201-211, 66 Stat. 163, 175-81. Although this case involved
deportation due to fraud, the aliens were not being deported for being excludable under § 212(a)(19)
(seeking to enter by fraud or willful misrepresentation).
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the 1957 Act, 186 which waived deportation for two types of aliens who
had entered the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. An
alien who was the spouse, parent, or child of a United States citizen
or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence could seek
a waiver if he was otherwise admissible at the time of entry. But an
alien who had misrepresented his nationality and had entered during
the postwar period could seek a waiver if he was otherwise admissible
at the time of entry and if he did not engage in misrepresentations
to evade quota restrictions or an investigation. The Court interpreted
this to mean that despite two kinds of fraud, an alien would still remain "otherwise admissible." If the required family relationship was
missing, however, either of those types of fraud would prevent the
alien from benefiting from the section. 187 The Court also indicated that
the section was intended to provide humanitarian relief by preventing
the separation of families. 188
Justice Stewart's dissent stressed that section 241(f) applied only to
deportation based on fraudulent entry. The aliens in Errico were to
be deported under a different section. 189 He also said that the aliens
were not "otherwise admissible" because they were not within their
proper quotas. 190 Justice Stewart took the view that the section was
intended to have no effect on the quota system. 191 In looking at the
use of the term "otherwise admissible" in other sections of the INA,
Justice Stewart found that it usually followed grounds for admissibility
or exceptions to deportation, thus suggesting that all other immigration requirements would be covered by the term. 192
The Court did not even discuss the question whether the aliens' failure
to comply with the documentary requirements section constituted a
ground for excludability as the term is used in section 24l(a)(l). 193 Even
under the Errico doctrine, if excludability were to be determined by
reference solely to section 212(a)(l9), then there would be a legitimate
question whether the aliens in Errico could benefit from the waiver
or even whether they were "otherwise admissible." Needless to say,
the Errico approach left the lower courts in a state of confusion about
186. Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 3, 71 Stat. 639, 640 (1957).
187. 385 U.S. at 223.
188. Id. at 225; see also H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1961).
189. 385 U.S. at 227 (Stewart, J ., dissenting).
190. Id. at 228 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 228 & n.4 (quoting Senator Eastland that "the bill does not modify the national
origins quota provisions." 103 CoNG. REc. 15,487 (1957)).
192. 385 U.S. at 229.
193. Section 24l(f) really only deals with excludability under section 212(a)(l9) because of
fraud. The INS relied in Errico on a different provision, § 211, which had to do with the alien's
being charged to the proper quota and which was not the excludability provision requiring fraud.
It is surprising, therefore, that the Court in Errico did not discuss this specific question about
the section upon which it relied.
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the appropriate application of section 241(0. Some courts found that
it waived quantitative grounds 194 while others thought it waived any
deportation charge for which fraud was germane. 195
In Reid v. INS, 196 the Supreme Court had another opportunity to
apply section 241(0 and held the waiver is available only to persons
subject to deportation under section 241(a)(l) because their entry was
procured by fraud. 197 In that case the INS wanted to deport the aliens
on the basis of their entry without inspection, 198 an independent ground
of deportation under section 241(a)(2). The aliens claimed that section
241(0 applied to them because they had secured entry into the United
States through fraud which rendered them excludable at the time of
entry, 199 and therefore deportable. 200
The Court disagreed with the aliens. Unfortunately, the aliens in
Reid had misrepresented themselves as citizens of the United States
and therefore had completely frustrated the inspection process. On this
basis, the Court had no difficulty in upholding the legitimacy of the
deportation charge under section 241(a)(2), even though it conceded
that the aliens would have peen excludable under section 212(a)(19) if
their fraud had been detected at the time ~f entry.
The Court went further and affirmed the holding in Errico that the
section 241(0 waiver applies not only to deportation based on excludability under section 212(a)(19), but also to deportation based on
the quota requirements of section 21 l(a). 201 Further, the Court said
that section 241(0 would not apply to waive any ground of excludability
other than that in section 212(a)(19). This was an important clarification because the INS often alleged that the alien was deportable because
of his excludability under provisions other than section 212(a)(19). After
Reid, aliens found it difficult to get the benefit of section 241(0 as
long as the INS relied on some provision other than section 212(a)(19). 202
194. See Jolley v. INS, 441 F.2d 1245, 1252-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971);
Godoy v. Rosenberg, 415 F.2d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1969).
195. See Muslemi v. INS, 408 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1969).
196. 420 U.S. 619 (1975).
197. Id. at 630.
198. An alien is deportable if he "entered the United States without inspection or at any
time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States in
violation of this Chapter or in violation of any other law of the United States." INA§ 24l(a)(2),
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982).
199. See INA § 212(a)(l9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982).
200. See INA § 241(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l) (1982).
201. 420 U.S. at 630.
202. See Morales-Cruz v. United States, 666 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1982) (entry without labor
certification under § 212(a)(14)); Skelly v. INS, 630 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1980) (entry without
labor certification under § 212(a)(l4)); Escobar-Ordonez v. INS, 526 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam) (alien deportable for entry with fraudulent visa), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 938 (1976); CastroGuerrero v. INS, 515 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1975) (alien deportable for entry without proper registration). But see Cacho v. INS, 547 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1976) (waiver still available even though
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After Reid, the 1981 amendments to section 241(0 provided further
clarification on the extent of the section 241 (0 waiver. 203 The statute
now covers innocent, as well as willful, misrepresentations, thus
clarifying doubts about that question. 204 The statute now limits relief
to an alien who is in possession of "an immigrant visa or equivalent
document." This is an important provision because it affirms decisions which have denied relief to aliens who entered without
inspection, 205 or surreptitiously, 206 and even to aliens who entered as
nonimmigrants. 201
The other significant achievement of the 1981 amendments is the application of the waiver to an inadmissibility based on the alien's lack
of labor certification or of a valid immigrant visa, or to inadmissibility
based on an allocation of the alien's visa to the wrong preference
category, all resulting from the alien's fraud. Obviously, this broadens
the scope of section 241(0 for aliens because they have had to contend
in the past with deportation charges which, though sounding in fraud,
were technically outside the scope of the waiver because they could
be classified under sections other than 2l2(a)(l9).
CONCLUSION

There is a growing consensus in the United States favoring reform
of the immigration system. There is a feeling that the government has
little control over the number of immigrants coming into this country
and that the system is unable to absorb all of those who enter the
labor market. Further, the present labor certification procedure may
give entering aliens and the American public the perception that ''many
illegal aliens are working in non-menial jobs which unemployed,
underemployed, or less well paid Americans would clearly take. " 208
The continuing discussion by Congress of the Immigration Reform and

deportation charged under § 212(a)(20) because of invalid visa); Persaud v. INS, 537 F.2d 776
(3d Cir. 1976) (same); In re Da Lomba, 16 I. & N. Dec. 616 (BIA 1978) (§ 24l(f) forgives deportability under § 212(a)(20) and § 24l(c)).
203. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 8,
95 Stat. 1611, 1616.
204. This codifies prior judicial and administrative decisions concerning innocent misrepresentations. See In re Yuen Lan Hom, 289 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re Ideis, 14 I. & N .
. Dec. 701 (BIA 1974); In re Louie, 14 I. & N. Dec. 421 (BIA 1973). These cases were overruled
by In re Raqueno, 17 I. & N. Dec. 10 (BIA I 979).
205. See Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975) (false claim to U.S. citizenship); Cornejo-Molina
v. INS, 649 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1981) (same).
206. Cortez-Flores v. INS, 500 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Monarrez-Monarrez
v. INS, 472 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); In re Checa, 14 I. & N. Dec. 661 (BIA 1974).
207. Delgado v. INS, 637 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1980); Cortez-Flores v. INS, 500 F.2d 178
(5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
208. S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983).
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Control Act 209 provides some hope for a resolution of these immigration problems.
The Senate version of the Reform Act makes some changes in the
labor certification procedure by requiring the Labor Department to
consider the availability of qualified workers throughout the United
States rather than restricting its findings to the place where the alien
will be employed. 210 This represents a decided shift in the concept of
.labor availability and places the burden on the employer to seek out
workers in other areas of the United States. Furthermore, the Labor
Department must certify that there are not sufficient workers in the
United States that could be trained for the position within a reasonable
period of time. 211 The Department's certification decisions would be
reviewable but could not be set aside unless they were arbitrary and
capricious. 212
Despite this new language, neither the House nor the Senate version
of the Reform Act deals with the division of jurisdiction between the
Labor Department and the INS. There is room for clarification whether
the Labor Department's certification is merely an assurance that there
are not sufficient workers in the United States available for the particular assignment and that the alien's employment will not adversely
affect the wages and working conditions of workers already here. 213
The difficulty arises because the INS has the jurisdiction to evaluate
a preference petition and the language in the statute requiring a "consultation with the Secretary of Labor'' is not clear enough to delineate
the extent of jurisdiction for the INS in passing on the petition. 214 If
this matter is. not addressed, the conflict will continue over the functions of the INS and the Labor Department. 215 There is also a need
to clarify the language in the INA used by courts to determine the
alien's intent regarding his certified employment. The law must strike

209. Congress is still considering the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983, popularly known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. The Senate bill, S. 529, passed the Senate on May 18,
1983. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S6969-70 (daily ed. May 18, 1983). The
House version, H.R. 1510, was reported by the House Judiciary Committee on May 13, 1983
and referred to four other committees. H.R. 115, Pt. I, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). It is anticipated
that the bill will reach the House floor sometime in 1984. See J. VIALET, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND LEGISLATION IN THE 98TH CONGRESS
(Issue Brief No. IB83087 1983).
210. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203, 129 CONG. REc. S6978-79 (daily ed. May 18, 1983).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Compare Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983) and Joseph v. Landon,
679 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) with Castaneda-Gonzales v. INS, 564 F.2d 417 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) and Singh v. Attorney General, 510 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd mem., 672
F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
214. See INA § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (1982).
215. See K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 6~9 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
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a balance between upward mobility for aliens and security for American
jobs and wages.
There has been some discomfort with the practice of adjusting aliens
from nonimmigrant to immigrant status. The House reform bill denies
adjustment to an alien who has accepted unauthorized employment
or who is not in a legal status at the time the adjustment application
is filed. 216 The Senate's version goes even further by denying adjustment of status if the alien "has failed to maintain continuously a legal
status since entry into the United States." 211 The latter restriction would
deny adjustment, therefore, not only to aliens who have accepted
unauthorized employment, but also to those who have overstayed
without permission of the INS. Since the adjustment is discretionary
with the Attorney General, the privilege is therefore restricted to those
aliens who have not violated their status; this would turn out to be
a privilege since many violations are related to unauthorized
employment.
Unfortunately, the Reform Act does not deal with the relationship
between rescission and deportation, and the question about the statute
of limitations still exists. Although the Attorney General's decision in
In re Belenzo was clear, a tension still exists between the rescission
and deportation provisions concerning the issue. If Congress intended
to give the Attorney General the discretion to use either provision
regardless of the circumstances, then there is a need for statutory
clarification. It is certainly reasonable to construe the rescission statute
as the exclusive method for proceeding against aliens who have obtained
legal permanent residence through adjustment. If the limitation of the
rescission provision is a matter of legislative oversight, 218 then now is
the time to correct the imprecision, since the Act is being revised. There
is no need to provide an additional vehicle for removing an alien's
lawful permanent status if the deportation procedure already exists and
if nothing is intended to be added by the rescission provision.
Our immigration law has a long and varied history. 219 Amendments
occurring at different times have been the result of different constituencies and different, and sometimes contradictory, motivations. 220
As certain provisions become outmoded, or advocates and courts find
new ways to interpret them, ambiguities and inconsistencies arise. For
the most part, the BIA and the courts have followed principles of equity
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and statutory interpretation to develop satisfactory solutions. Since Congress is considering major changes in the INA, these interpretive problems should be addressed. The result will be a fairer, clearer American
law of immigration.

